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Yumiko Mikanagi 
Explaining Com品目Women 
According to the existing literatu日，theinstitutionalization of the system of comfort 
women was needed to avoid rape According to Nishino, the Japanese military learned a 
hard lesson after World War I (Nishina 1992・ 41) When the Japanese mihtary was 
stationed in Siberia, Japanese soldiers committed extensive rape of local women resulting 
in the spread of venereal diseases Rape became a central concern for the military leaders 
because spread of venereal diseases meant a drastic loss of soldiers，日ghtingcapability 
(Hikosaka I 991：・45,N1shino 1992: 41). Thus. comfort stations were established with the 
explicit purpose of allowing sold開店 tohave sex without the risk of venereal diseases 
(Nishino 1992・44,Yosh1m1 1995: 32). 
How were vene陀 aldiseases to be avoided if soldiers were stil allowed to問main
sexually active? Military doctor Aso’s report issued on 26 June 1939, which became a 
bluepnnt for designing comfort stations in China, suggested that among those who were 
recruited as comfort 、vomen,young (under twenty yea悶 old)Korean women were 
quali日edas 'p問sentsfor imperial soldie四’（Nishino1992: 44) The report recommended 
that Japanese women (in the potential pool of comfort women) should be avoided 
because they were often old and had already worked as prostitutes so that they tended to 
be already infected with ve回目aldiseases. In addition to the active recruitment of young 
women, concern for venereal diseases led the military to adopt strict rules regardmg the 
use of comfort stations Soldiers were required to use condoms - often called eise1 
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sakku or‘totsugeki 1c/11ban' and other preventive med1cat1ons (Nishina 1992: 85-96) 
The establishment of comfort stations may truly reflect the beliefs upheld by 
military officers that regulated prostitution would decrease the rate of infection with 
venereal diseases."" But continued high rates of infection with venereal diseases 
(Yoshimi 1995: 49, !CJ 1994: 129) as well as increasing numbers of rape during the 
durauon of the War (Yoshimi 1992: 200-2, Yoshimi 1995 43-7),11" indicate that the 
comfort women system proved to be an ineffective means to attain the goal of preventing 
vene陀aldiseases. However, the military never gave up its operation of comfort stations 
until the end of the War. The continued operation of comfort stations on the one hand, 
and the persistent occurrence of rape and the spread of venereal diseases among soldiers 
on the other hand, suggest reasons other than prevention of venereal diseases explain 
why the military continued to operate comfort stations 
Furthermore, there is no logical link between the need to suppress the spread of 
venereal diseases and the establishment of comfort stations As I will discuss below, 
there are other ways to avmd the spread of vene問aldiseases, such as encouragement of 
and/or forced abstention in exchange for home-leave holidays Thus, prevention of 
venereal diseases is an insufficient explanation for the institutionalization of rape 
The dommant explanation for the second question, that 1s, why mostly Korean 
women were abused, is already found in the explanation provided above The stated 
reason why Ko問anwomen were used as comfort women was prevention of venereal 
diseases because they were most often younger (1 e. virgms) and thus free of venereal 
diseases (Nishino 1992・44,Hikosaka p 47) However, again, the stated reason leaves 
room for further explanation. 
Suzuki asks if bemg a virgin was the most important condition, why we日n'tyoung 
Japanese girls recruitedマTheanswer is that Japanese women were needed for 
問productionunder the national policy of‘bear babies, mcrease the population' (wneyo 
fuyaseyo) (Kim 1976: 76, Nagahara and Yoneda 1986. 115, Suzuki 1992: 3).181 
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However, the preference for young Ko問anwomen under twenty years old rende自由IS
explanation less convincing. According to the Outline for Population Policy adopted in 
January 1941, the government proposed that women over twenty one years old must be 
married so they can bear more children (Kondo 1995: 490-3). This meant, Japanese 
women under twenty we問 availableto be used as comfort women if the government 
decided to do so Some may argue that it was not possible because sexual slavery would 
have made these young Japanese women unable to reproduce later on It ts true that 
mcessant raping made many former comfort women unable to reproduce but it ts unlikely 
that the military leaders antictpated thts effect on women’s bodies at the time they 
decided to use young women as comfort women Thus the fact that Japanese women of 
ages equivalent to those of Korean comfort women were not mobilized as comfort 
women must be explained by reasons other than need for increased reproduction. 
In sum, extsting explanations offer 叩日•ersto the questions on the instttutionalization 
of rape and use of Korean women only partially at best In the remaimng part of this 
section, therefore, I will attempt to offer alternative explanations based on three different 
approaches. 
Myths about Male Sexuality 
First, beltefs about male sexuality offer an answer to the question why comfort 
stations were used as a solution to fears of rampant rapes and田sultingspread of venereal 
diseases among soldte四 AsI already mentioned, there is no logical link between the 
prevention of mfection with venereal diseases and the establishment of the comfort 
women system Two alternatives were possible: to establish rec田ationalfacilities, and/or 
to grant home leave holidays to soldiers (Hikosaka 1991: 159). 
It is not that these two alternatives did not exist in the pool of ideas held by the 
military officers On the contrary, there we田 somein the Japanese military who proposed 
these two alternatives to comfort women For example, the military doctor Hayao Torno 
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recommended the establishment of ‘respectable’recreational facilities such as‘cinemas, 
theaters, music halls, libraries, museums’m order to p田ventrepetition of atrociues 
committed by the Japanese army in Nankmg (Nishino 1992・7583) Moreover.，回co吋s
indicate that the military did thmk about granting special holidays to soldiers and 
allowing fami!tes to visit soldiers Accordmg to the journal of Kinehara Setsuzo, in 
October 1942, Prime Minister Tojo supported the idea of ho!tdays for sold回目（quotedin 
Yoshimi 1995: 70). Holidays were not only for soldiers to go see their families Holidays 
could also have helped the national goal of accelerating the b!fth rate 
Despite such proposals, however, neither recreational facilities nor holidays replaced 
the system of comfort women (Yoshimi 1995: 52) Why not? Hikosaka concludes that 
sol di問問’holidayswe問 notadopted because of ‘material and spiritual poverty’（Hikosaka 
1991 159). Matenally speaking, it is well known that the Japanese mi!ttary was far 
behind its opponents For example, the US military was able to send its soldiers home on 
a日gularbasis (Yosh1mi 1995. 206) but the Japanese military was physically unable to 
do that because of its inferior transportation capacity For example, existing data on civil 
aviation mdicate that the US capacity to transport passeng町swas 68 times larger than 
that of Japan’s in1936 (Wakatsuki I 995a: 7）.σ五回edata are not actual data on military 
住ansportationcapabilities, but they do indicate the vast difference that existed between 
the transpoロationcapabilities of the US and Japanese mi!ttanes.) Thus, the Japan田e
military resorted to the strategy of so-called genchi chδtatsu (local acquisition) of focd 
and ammunition (Wakatsuki 1995a 134 7) In tenns of‘spiritual poveny,' as I discuss 
below, soldiers (as well as other individuals such as comfort women and civilians) we問
seen as‘things,' not humans, and therefore, i IS unlikely that the military leaders 
seriously thought that soldiers needed vacations 
What about the establishment of more‘respectable’facilities? Why did not the 
『nilitaryreplace comfort women system with other services to entertain soldiers? I 
contend that the reason why comfort women system was chosen as a prefe汀edmethod of 
、l/omeo,the Stote, onn 、l/;r 41 
keeping soldiers happy is closely related to the beliefs about war and male sexuality that 
exisied in the minds of milit町yofficials and soldiers The myths evolved around three 
mutually related beltefs about male sexualtty 
(I) Belief one: Male physiology requt問ssex on a regular basis 
This view of male sexuality was shared widely among government of日cialsand 
military personnel before the War. For example, Garon口tesa view of a hygiene official 
who cons1de問dthat‘male body needed to salisfy sexual lust' in 1900 (Garon 1997・IOI)
The military believed that‘to deprive young men of women for many years is to go 
against human sexual instinct' (Hikosaka 1991: 41, translation mine) Hicks quotes a 
statement by a former Japanese soldier who held that 'the Japanese realized that .the 
troops’biological (i.e sexual) needs could not be turned off (Hicks 1994. 144, addition 
mine) This idea led to the idea that soldie四 neededwomen like they needed food and 
water. As food could be used as a special treat for soldiers, women were sometimes 
granted as‘special gifts’For instance, in Northern Burma, where battles with large 
numbers of fatal山田 occurred,the Japanese military gave soldiers comfort women as 
special gifts to soldie四 whowere sent for one-way missions (Kim 1977: 212) 
In sum, many Japanese, including those in the military, believed and to some extent 
stil believe (Murase 1993 52) that supp回目ionof male hbido was not po田ibleand even 
if it were possible, it would cause physical problems such as neurological disorder 
(Hikosaka 1991・155)'"' 
(2) Beltef two: If men we問 notallowed to have sex with women, then they would cause 
trouble to the military 
Because male physiology reqmred regular sex, if men we日 forcedto abstain, it was 
believed to cause a variety of problems. For example, in the Air Force, it was‘believed 
[that] sexual deprivation made pilots accident prone’（Hicks 1994: 121). Furthermo日，
sexual deprivation was thought to be bad for the military’s relationship wi由 civ1han
women because repression of sexual desires would lead to increased rape 
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This behef on male sexuality was commonly held befo問 thebeginnmg of由ewar. 
According to Garon, proponents of licensed prostitution, who dommated the Japanese 
society and the government before World War I, assumed that‘問pressmgthe sexual 
desires of men would only lead to increased rape and other sex cnmes’（Garon 1997: 
100). Even Fukuzawa Yukichi, a leading philosopher of this penod with good knowledge 
of the western thinking, maintained that smgle men needed prostitutes, otherwise social 
order would be disrupted (Garon 197・ IOI) 
In time of war, many, if not al, believed that male sexual desi問 increased.Not only 
did this mean that soldiers needed to have sex more than men in peacel!me, but if their 
sexual needs we陪 notmet, soldiers were more likely to cause trouble. Sasaki states that 
'facing the high hkelihood of death, the instmct of survival increased hbido’（Sasaki 
1973：・ 314).In interviews conducted by Uetsubo, many veterans stated that‘right before 
attack, we cleared our feelings (sukkirishite) by sleeping with women’（Uetsubo I 977: 
174）凹｝
(3) Belief three: Sex with women strengthened soldiers’fighting capabilities 
The thlfd behef was the日1pside of the second belief. If sex deprivation was a minus 
for the military, sex opportunity for sold出回wasperceived to be a plus for the mihtary. 
In the third belief, if soldiers were allowed to have sex, soldiers’日ghtingcapacity was 
thought to increase. Thus, young soldiers were encouraged to use comfort facihties 
because‘sex would build up their morale' (Hicks 1994: I 16). This view, I believe, is 
based on the idea that women were o吋ectsto be conquered and thus men a肥 perceived
to increase thelf agg回目1veinstinct by first conquering women. This view is consistent 
with the view commonly held within the Japanese military that‘virgin men are not real 
men’（Yoshimi 1995: 223). 
Whether the above beliefs are supported by scientific evidence or not is not relevant 
here What is important, instead, is that these were widely shared beliefs by both officers 
and soldiers explain why the comfort women system was chosen to keep soldiers 
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‘happy’＂ as opposed to other methods discussed above. However, we should not 
assume a direct link between such be!tefs and the actual policy implemented by the 
military We need to further probe into the structure of the state which allowed these 
be!tefs to be translated into policy decisions. 
The Japanese State: Its Ideology and Decisionmaking 
The second approach focuses on the Japanese state. In this section, we will first look 
at the don】inantideology held by Japanese government officials regarding the people 
under ts rule. Then, we will examine the role of the Japanese m11ttary in establishing the 
comfort women system Finally, we will unravel roles played by non-military government 
actors. 
(1) State Ideology 
The Japanese state’s view of the people under its rule before World War I was not 
like the ones held by advanced democracies Under the M目diConstitution, the Japanese 
people were not citizens with full-fledged rights and仕eedombut were‘SU吋ects’ofthe 
emperor The methods used by the Japanese government to disseminate‘emperor-system 
ideology’which in tum was used to inculcate 'patriotism, loyalty to the emperor and the 
virtues of diligence and thri白’（Garon1997: 5) included the use of Kyδiku Chokugo 
(Imperial Rescript on Education, 1890), Kokutai no Hongi (Fundamental Principles of 
the National Polity, 1937), Sltmmin no Mic/ti (The Way of Subjects, 1941). The回sultof 
this ideology was that large numbers of Japanese believed that it was most honorable to 
fight and die for the emperor This view that the Japanese people (which tncluded people 
in occupied areas) we田 toserve the emperor and the imperial state was fort日edin time 
of war and put into practice as the extensive use (and abuse) of tndividuals to win the 
war Thus, during World War I, both men and women, Japanese or non Japanese, we問
fully mobilized without protection of their basic rights. 
Of course, neglect of individual rights was not done uniformly across class. ethni口ty
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and gender. Mobilizatron of Japanese people varied depending on class, for example. For 
instance, those who were drafted as soldiers pnmanly came from poor ural areas and 
sons of the wealthy upper class were often exempt from or allowed to defer conscription."" 
As for women, general mobilization of women was not done until 1944,<'" because 
mobilization of women conflicted with the government’s pronatalist policy. The result of 
incomplete mobilization was that while women from the working class worked in 
ammunition factories, middle class women who could afford to stay home were 
encouraged to do so so that they could reproduce"" 
While such differences existed among people of different classes, the gap that 
existed between men and women was much larger Under the Meiji legal system, not 
only were women the emperor’s SU吋ects,but also they were property belonging to men. 
Under the Meiji Civil Code (1898), for example, men monopolized the right of inheritance 
whereas married women were陀nderedlegally incompetent. Moreover, laws田garding
children born out of a wedlock and adultery gave men extensive sexual freedom whereas 
women’s sexual f田edomwas highly悶stricted(Yoshim1 1995: 224-5, Garon 1997: 99). 
In sum, if men e~リoyed respect for their rights on property and sexual freedom even 
under the repressive Meiji state, women’s rights we問 doublyrejected by the state and by 
the male dominant legal system. 
The treatment of the people in occupied areas was also based on the ‘emperor-
system ideology'. However the implication of the ideology to the Koreans and Taiwanese 
was highly racist Because the ideology held that the‘emperor rs a living god and thus 
Japan is the invincible land of god,' Korea and China we肥 regardedas inferior (Mahara 
and Senda 1992: 85, translation mine). As for men from occupied areas, the racism 
materialized in the form of forced loyalty to the Japanese state and labor under inhumane 
conditrons Thus, young men、目白conscriptedto fight for the Imperial Army, and large 
numbers of older Korean men were forced to take up jobs under strenuous working 
conditions (Nishmo 1992・59, 136-40) related to mimng or ammunition production (Kim 
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1976: 54). 
Because gender discrimmation was added to this racism, within the group of 
discriminated Koreans and Taiwanese, women received the lowe't respect by the 
Japane'e state contrary to a beltef that‘we (i.e. people ruled by the Japanese state) al 
suffered (equally) during the war' (Kamisaka and Hata 1996, translation and addition 
mine). Japan’s treatment of women in the colonized areas was worse than that of men 
because it was not just about the abuse of their labor but also it w田 abnutthe abuse of 
their sexuality. Japan’s treatment of these women were worse than that of Japanese 
women who also suffered gender discnmmation. The proof is that, as I already 
mentioned, Japanese women’s bodies and their reproductive capabiltties were protected 
by the state policy as mothers of future soldiers. It 1s true that this itself shows lack of 
respect for Japanese women as indtviduals but the fact that their bodies were protected by 
the state must not be neglected. In cont阻st,Korean women (and Taiwanese women, too) 
were only seen as sex objects and as a result large numbers of Korean women were 
forced to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese military and suffe問dextensive psychological 
and physical damage throughout thetr lives "" 
(2) Structure of the Military 
Now that we have seen the natu問 ofthe ideology held by the Japanese state at the 
time of the War, we need to see the posittons of different actors within the Japanese state 
As we have already seen, the Japanese milit町yplayed a central role in the establishment 
of the system of comfort women. We also saw that the mihtary held a particular view on 
male sexuahty. In this section, we will examine the structure of the military and see how 
and why the structure gave rise to the need for the comfort women system 
Rape is about violence. It is a violation of women’s physical and mental integrity 
Because it is universally true that military discipline mvolves elements of violence, 
mil itaries were often assoctated with rape. As Hi回chfeldnoted, one of the pu甲osesof 
military training was to ehminate soldiers’personal feelmgs and thereby make them 
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willing to blindly follow orders and give up their lives. The military trainmg, therefore, IS 
'not very much different from activities at actual war which promotes a variety of 
impulsive emotions such as sexual excitement, cruelty and violence' (Hirschfeld 1954: 
182 3). 
The Japanese m1htary was not exempt from the brutal disciplining of soldiers 
Kumazawa notes that hazing (ri11ch1, lynch) was explicitly prohibited in the Japan田e
military and 1t was rare among soldiers with vast difference in rank. However, among 
soldiers with no or litle diffe田ncein their ranks, it was not uncommon (Kumazawa 
1974 133) 126> Kumazawa further explains that violence exercised (against Chinese 
people) by the Japanese mtht町ywas a reflection of 'internal contradicuon' (Kumazawa 
1974. 150), referring to the use of violence as a means to discipline soldiers Wakat印刷
also equates repression within the military and looting, murd町， andrape committed by 
the soldiers which were perceived as‘precious freedom' (Wakat印刷 1995b. 133). 
Such internal violence and contradiction may explain rampant rape. However, does 
1t explam the institutionalization of rapeワSuzukilmks this internal contradiction with the 
institutionalization of military prostitution. She maintains that military leaders knew that 
soldie日 wouldrebel against their o節目白ifnothmg was done to vent their frustration at 
the various contradictions of military life Thus, comfort women were given to pacify the 
soldiers (Suzuki 1992・37).Suzuki concludes that‘women’s sexuality was violated in the 
name of the emperor’but at the same time men’s sexuality was controlled by the state 
(Suzuki 1991: !05). In sum, violence and contradiction within the military gave rise to 
the need to compensate for the psychological and physical damage m日1ctedupon soldiers 
(3) Position of Other Government Acto四 andTheir Relauon to the Military 
What were the attitudes of officials in other branches of the government? Out of the 
three mmistries that were the most powerful within the Japanese government before the 
beginning of the War (Wakatsuki 1995a: 72), namely the Ministry of Home Affatrs 
(Naimusho), Mimstry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Finance, the first two are 
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relevant to the decisionmakmg問latedto the issue of comfort women Yoshimt notes that 
the Ministry of Home Affairs passively supported the military’s policy. In a leter sent 
from the ministry to governors of al prefectures on 23 February 1938, the ministry 
granted the 'tacit approval’（moktmin) to the emigration of those who were over 21 year 
old and already working as prostitutes to work as comfort women. What this indicates is 
that the Home Ministry was afraid of breaching the International Con、（entionof 4 May 
1910 for the White Slave Traffic and the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Traffic in Women and Children of 1921, which Japan ratified in 1925. At the same 
time, however, there was no equivalent order issued to the occupied areas, which means 
that the ministry was passively approving町affickingof Korean and Taiwanese women 
(Yoshimi 1994: 93, Yoshim1 1997 45). 
To be sure, there are some reasons to believe that the ministry was opposed to the 
use of comfort women. After al, it was the police, which was under the control of the 
Home Ministry, which responded to the abolitionist movement and worked to limit the 
number of licensed prostitutes in the 1920s (Yoshimi 1997: 46) However, this fact does 
not prove that the police was concerned about prostitution and rape done outside of the 
mainland 
The Ministry of Foreign Affatrs also was not too supportive of the trafficking of 
women. A response by Fo田1gnMinister Togo to a telegram sent by a head of the foreign 
affairs office (gaij1bucho) Hachiya of Taiwan colonial government, indicates the 
ministry’s o町ectionsagainst issuing of visas to women who were sent to Southeast Asia 
as comfort women (Yoshimi 1992. 142-3) However, the mmistry failed to prevent any 
of the actions taken by the military by the time the Japanese military began its extensive 
construction of comfort stations in China 
Whether this lack of resistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affatrs is due to the 
relative decline of its power within the Japanese government vis-a-vis the military or the 
mmistry’s tacit support of the military’s action is not clear, however On the one hand, 
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records indicate that, by 1938, the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
significantly weakened m relation to the military. A leter sent by the Shanghai Consulate 
General to the Nanking Consulate General on 5 July 1938 showed that a meeting held by 
the officials of the ministries of the Army, Navy and Fa問ignAffairs resulted in the 
decision that the Nanking Consulate General would lose control over operations of 
military-related bars，出staurantsand brothels (comfort stations) (Yoshimi 1992: 177 80). 
On the other hand, however, some argue that within the Ministry of Fa問 ignAffairs, 
there was a rise of a faction that actively supported the policy of the military after the 
Manchurian crisis (Wakatsuki 1995b: 87-9). The Renovationist faction led by Arita 
Hachiro‘strongly supported the idea of Japan’s special poS1tion in east A訂正 and
proposed that Japan ‘should adopt strong measures toward Chma’（Usm 1973 147). 
Because this line of policy was quite similar to the one held by the military, it is quite 
possible that it was not the loss of power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that made the 
ministry ineffective in opposing the actions taken by the military but the Ministry of 
Foreign Affai四 wasm fact in support of the military. 
As for the colonial governments that ruled Korea and Taiwan, Yoshimi concludes 
that these governments were mvolved in the recruitment of comfort women in one way 
or another. In both Korea and Taiwan, police departments were involved in the 
recruitment of comfort women Due to the meager information, Yosh1mi admits that It is 
unclear whether the police departments were directly involved in the recruitment of 
comfort women or they tacitly supported illegal operations. However, police stat10ns 
were in charge of issuing emigration visas and they were in the position to gain 
information on individuals’occupatrnn, family background, purpose of travel. Thus, 
Yoshimi concludes that the police departments we町田thersupporting the recruitment of 
comfort women or liable for occupational negligence (Yoshimi 1994: 93-4). 
ln sum, the military faced a need to deal w』thits internal contradictions arising from 
reliance on violence as a basis for soldier discipline Because of the beliefs on male 
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sexuality which we回 widelyshar℃d by mtlitary oficials, the only solutton to deal with 
the internal contradiction and keep soldiers from rebelling agamst their commande四 was
to give them women. This policy was supported m two ways. First, the state ideology 
helped abuse people from colonized areas, women, in p町ticular.Second, this policy saw 
no exp日ct!objections from non-military actors within the Japanese government 
Combined with the lack of democratic checks by the people on actrnns taken by the 
government due to the lack of democratic institutions and extensive censorship, the 
environment was favorable for the military to instttutionalize the comfort women system 
using mostly women from Japanese colonies.'"' 
The International Factors 
The final explanation will focus on the international environment that affected 
Japan’s policy making. In addition to the domestic conditions -beliefs on male 
sexuality, state ideology, and the structure of decis1onmaking withm the Japanese state 
that worked in favor of establishing comfort women system, Japan’s conscious and 
selective modernization served as a historical backdrop for the need to institutionalize, in 
this case, internalize (read conceal) extensive rape. 
Since the beginning of the Meiji period, the most important goal of the Japanese 
government was to modernize (read westernize) the Japan田esocio political system 
which was deemed necessary by government officials to attain equal status with Western 
powers. In concrete terms, attamment of equal status meant, in part, revision of treaties 
that gave Weste澗 powersunilateral acc田sto Japanese ports and ex凶 tenitoriality
What is relevant here is the issue of extraterritoriality. One of the major reasons why 
Western powe四 demandedextraterritonality in Japan was that they viewed the Japanese 
legal system as primitive Thus, the pnmary concern of foreigners residing in Japan was 
inhumane criminal punishments There were other aspects of the Japanese legal system, 
such as the existence of licensed prostitution, which contradicted the laws of some 
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Wc,tcrn nations and were deemed offensive in some Western soc1et1es However, It was 
not until the Maria L1z incident of 1872 that the government realized the laws related to 
prostitution and sexuality damaged Japan’s international reputation山｝
The Mana L 1z incident of 1872 linked the existence of brothels and the issue of 
extraterritoriality Up until this mcident, prostitution was rarely considered morally 
objectionable in Japan although with the beginning of the M吋ipenod, government 
officials were increasingly exposed to Western ideas and these Meiji leaders who were 
‘eager to demonstrate Japan’S“civilized”status to the Western powers’（G町on1997: 91) 
began to see licensed prostitution as a sign of backwardne'5.四＞In the Maria Luz incident, 
a Peruvian boat, Maria Luz, loaded with Chmese‘immigrants’recruited in Macao was 
sh>pwrecked off the coast of Yokohama. While the boat was being repaired in Yokohama, 
an 'immig四nt'escaped and sought回fugewith the governor of Kanagawa. In the court 
proceedings, which tried the captain of the ship on the susp>cion that he was engaged in a 
slave trade, the defendant countercharged that the Japanese government had no right to 
puf'ue this case because it allowed traffrckmg of women domestically. The court 
dismissed the couotercharge and al the Chinese slaves were returned home However, 
the Japanese government took the Peruvian countercharge seriously and issued the 
Ordinance Liberating Prostitutes in 1872 (Mahara and Senda 1992: 94-5, Garon 1997: 
91) According to this ordinance, prostitutes no longer had to repay their debts to their 
keepers and we目 freedfrom their occupation. 
As the text of the Ordinance implies, this policy change did not signify 
acknowledgment of the mdividual rights of prostitutes In this ordinance, prostitutes are 
equated with‘cows and horses.’＂°＇ Moreover, the governments wh>ch faced opposition 
from the owners of brothels，‘searched for ways to satisfy both domestic needs for 
prostitution (zaisho ron) and international calls for protection of human righ臼 (jinken
yogo ron)' (Morisak1 1995: 157, translation mine). The implication was that the Japanese 
government was deeply worried about Western views of Japan as a backward nation in 
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terms of sexuality-related policies and was willing to make some legal (i.e formal) 
changes At the same time, the government was not willing to make subsJanJial changes 
in terms of the values that underlay the Japanese sense of sexuality and sex businesses. 
Another historical reason why the Japanese govemment became sensitive to the way 
it treated issues of the sexualtty was the nse of anti-Japanese sentiment in the West due 
to increasing number of Japanese prostitutes who worked overseas (karayuki) This was 
particularly true in the US because the田 we田 manyprostitutes among the Japanese who 
immigrated to the US since the beginning of the Meiji period. This was one factor 
leadmg to the rise of the anti-Japanese immigrant movement in the US (Kim 1980. 131) 
Moreover, after World War I, the deportation of Japanese prostitutes from Siberia, 
Manila and other cities tn Southeast Asia drew the world’s attention to Japan's 
trafficking in women and children. By 1920, the League of Nations took up this issue and 
agreed to ban trafficking of women and children (Morisaki 1995: 168) 
There is no official document that proves that the Japanese government 
institutionalized rape with such criticisms in its mind (hoping that institutionalization 
would hide the truth from the eyes of international critiques). It is true, however, that the 
atrocities committed by the Japanese army in Nanking in December 1937 were widely 
reported by the foreign press "" And some argue that the military was so sensitive to the 
foreign mass media that It established comfort stations to avoid further raping of Chinese 
women, but closed them in a couple of weeks as a response to a foreign media田port
(Yang 1995: 24, Kim 1995: 73). 
What the above cases indicate is that the system of comfort women is consistent 
with the Japanese government’s historical attitude toward the West. the Japanese 
government would make formal changes in order to convince the world that Japan was a 
modern natton (In the case of comfort women, the military replaced rape with the system 
of comfort women ) At the same time, however, Japan would maintain the substance of 
its political and cultural practices. (This meant that, in the case of comfort women, the 
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Japanese soldiers were continuously allowed to rape women from occupied areas.) 
Conclusion 
As I noted in the introduction, the Japanese pubhc lacks sufficient knowledge of the 
most recent history of its nation, including the issue of comfort women Forgetting the 
past, however does not erase elements of continuity in Japanese history. On the contrary, 
factors that led to the establishment of the system of comfort women, such as beliefs on 
male sexuality, gender discrimination, and racism stil exist in contemporary Japan It is 
回 ethat Japan is now democ阻tizedand the people are no longer ‘subjects’to serve the 
imperial system. However, even though the political structu問 haschanged quite a bit, 
values and beliefs shared by the Japanese people have not changed. If values and beliefs 
are as important as the structure of decis10nmaking m determming a nation’s public 
pohc1es, contmuity m the Japanese way of thinking on sexuality, gender, and race could 
lead to abuse of women’s bodies again. The collective amnesia IS dangerous for it could 
lead Japan to repeat the crimes of its past 
Notes 
(16) This belief that controlled prostitution lowers the risk of ve"e<eal diseases was widely held by 
hygiene officials which in turn supported licensed prostitution in the 1920s (Garon 1997: IO I). 
( 17) In tenns of the number of rapes, that the army criminal law had to be問visedin 1942 to陀duce
the p叩 altyf町四peindicates that the numbec actually increased (Utsumi 1997 34). The article 
89 of the mditary criminal law (promulgated in 1908) stipulated that penalty for stooling 
prope『tiesof citizens of occupied areas which accompanied rape was either lifetime 
imprisonment or imprisonment of seven yms or more and in the case of death occurring from 
the rape, the penalty would be eJther death or hfetime >mpnsonment However, th>S law w°' 
revised in 1942 and the penalty for raping a woman became imprisonment of one year or more 
and in case of death due to rape, the penalty was made either hfetime imprisonment or 
』mp口sonmentof seven years or more (Kasahara 1997: 26). 
(18) In an aロicleSuzuki wrote one year before, she seems to have accepted the oficial explanation 
for the recruitment of Ko問anwomen Suzuki asks why young Korean women we目 madeinto 
、.vomrn,the State, and 、l/<r 53 
comfort wome泊 Byrelying upon the military doctor Aso’s report, Suzuki upholds that 'cleon 
maide＂’were needed as a pre<ent for the soldim of the 』mperialarmy (Suzuki 1991: 104). 
(19) That abstention leads to physical problems ts an incon芭ctunderstanding of male physiology. 
According to Mu岡田， spermsdo nnt build up m male sexual organs but they either die or a問
absorbed into the body fluid （島form1993: 51 60) 
(20) A statement by a former comfort woman, Kurosu Kana, testifi≪ that cont悶ryto the statements 
of veterans, soldiers were too scared and therefore they were physically unable to have sex 
(Uctsubo 1977: 174). 
(21) I use出isterm in quotation marks bmuse even though officers might have thought comfort 
women kept soldiers happy, it may not necessarily be true for individual soldierち
(22) It was only on October I, 1943 that students were consc口開edto join the military. The law 
which exempted students from conmiption (ZLdgaku c/10s/ui dk; kaukei lrOki, 1927) stipulated 
that students who were enrolled in secondary (or equivalent) schcols and above are exempt 
from conscription until the student reached age 27 (this was田visedto age 26 in 1939) 
(Hikosaka 1984:152, Oe 1982: 65). 
(23) The government decided to mobilize women over 14 years old in September 1943 and adopted 
the Outline for Fnrtifying、I/omen’sVoluntary Service Corps System in Marc 1 1944 (The 
actual order which implemented this policy was issued in Augu<t 1944) (Suzuki 1997: 178 9) 
(24) A collaborationist Hani Setsuko’s statement in 1943 proves this P印刷 Hanicomplained about 
the unwillingness of educated women to" ork outside of their homes and recommended that al 
women of working ages be mobilized (Suzuki 1997: 88-92). Flljinka; 110 Doko published in 
1943 also observes that・themchi!ization of women is not done very well' (quoted in Suzuki 
1997: 177, translation mine). 
(25) Kim I Myon and othc凶 maintainthat this effect一destructionof Korean women’s re司productive
ability was intended by the Japanese government as part of 'gen目 ide’policy(1977: 70, 84; 
1976: 14; 1980: 224, Matsui 1993: 254, Suzuki 1997: 52). It is a well-known fact that Japan 
adopted an assimilationist policy in its colonies. Yet, whether the Japanese government 
intended to destroy n回justthe local culture but the people themselves needs to be examined 
carefully My contention is that it is unlikely that the Japanese invented system of comfort 
women to destroy Korean pop Jlation Theoretically, genocide by way of rape is conceivable in 
two ways. First, as in the cose of Bosnia，悶pecould be used to implant babies of the dominant 
race in the wombs of enemy women Second, as actually happened with many fo田nercomfort 
women, multiple rape for a long duration of time could日suitin loss of reproduetive abilities. 
However, it is unlikely that the Japanese military used Korean women wi白血epu叩oseof 
eventual genocide fot two 町田onsFirst, testimonies mdtcate that babies born from comfort 
women and fathe問dby Japanese soldiers did not町eeiveenough care and were often left to 
die. Second, it is unlikely that military leaders had a good knowledge of the effect of multiple 
rape on women’s reproductive ability 
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(26) Hazing involved both psychological such as‘reveo!ing persocal secrets, verbal insult, ＂阿部 m
(ili1ik1), insult Uc ami）’Physical violence ranged from standing stil for a long tenn to beating 
with variety of objects. Other examples of hazing we田‘borrowing’money,cigarette and other 
luxury items (without出 urningthem) and making others pay f町 tripsto movie theote四 andspa 
(Oe 1982 89). 
(27) Hicks notes that despite the p陀senceof ample sexual services around the US bases, the reason 
why military pre同itutionis not formalized is because 'public opinion would not acknowledge 
their need'(Hicks 1994: 83). 
Maha悶 andSenda also note that the日asonswhy institutionalized military prostitution did 
not exist in the、/Vestafter 、/Vorld、/VarI was because of the social movements against such 
policy (Mahara and Senda 1992: 97). Yoshimi also states that lack of social movemects, public 
opinion and parliament that protects women’s rights led to establishment of military 
prostitution in Japan (Yoshimi 1995: 204). 
The lack of public opposition may also help explain why Nazis we陀 f『eeto establish 
comfort stations similar to those of Japan’s 
(28) In fact, foreigners who resided in Japan were often customers of Japanese brothels and 
prrntitutesσujime 1997: 9日）
(29) Traditionally, Japanese rega吋edsex and sexuality as part of the natural state of human lives. 、IViththe introduction of Confucianist ideas in the Edo period, however, the idea of sexuality 
began to change. For example, double standards for male and female sexuality were introduced 
based on the Cofucianist belief that women a悶 inferiorto men and the民foreonly men coo Id 
e町oyfreedom of sexual activities. The modem morality about sex "as, however, only shared 
by members of the urban upper class doring the Edo period, bot the idea permeated throoghout 
rural Japan during the M刊tperiod when the Meiji government ad叩tedpolicies to陀golate 
people’s sexuality (Ishikawa and Noguchi 1974：・8890). 
(30) The text問adsthat‘prostitutes and geisha are those who have lost rights over their bodie< and 
thos are no different from cows and horses. It would not be reasonable to demand the問tomof 
goods from a cow or horse' (Garon 1997: 91). 
(31) See, forexample, a田poロbyH.J. Timperley poblished in the Manchester G11ardia11 (Timperley 
1973). 
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女性、国家、および戦争一『従軍慰安婦Jをめぐって
〈要約〉
御忍由美子
本稿は、なぜ日本が第 2次世界大戦中に「従軍慰安婦J制度を創設し、女性
の身体を探閲したのかという聞いに答えを投げかけることを目的とする。この
論文では、まず先の戦争は軍部の独走によるものといった、今日の日本人が一
般的に信じている戦争の原因説明によらず、「従軍慰安婦」創設の説明を個人的
要因および国家の構造と国家により信奉されていたイデオロギーなどに求める。
さらに、当時日本政府のおかれていた国際的状況も勘案する。すなわち本稿で
は「従軍慰安婦」問題に対し、日本政治および政策決定における多様な側面を
検証するアプローチをとる。本稿のまず第一部では、当時社会全体に信じられ
ていた「おとこらしさjの神話について述べ、次に国家の構造と国家内の支配
的イデオロギーについて説明し、最後に国際環境がどう「従軍慰安婦」問題に
影響したかを分析する。
